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Martha A.  Field*
It  is  wonderful  now  to  have  a  permanent  Federal  Courts
section; we owe  thanks to Jack Beerman and  Michael Wells  and
others who helped bring this about. It seems to me the challenge
for  this  group  is  to  find  topics  for  discussion  that are  not too
convoluted.  With  federal  courts,  we  are  dealing  with  a  field  so
intellectually  overdeveloped  that it is almost  impossible to have
an intelligible  conversation about it. But it is wonderful  to have
here  a  group  dedicated  to trying.  And  it is  nice  for  us to  have
the opportunity  to come  together and to  see  some  faces  behind
the names  on  those law  review articles  we're  always  reading.
I want  to start by  drawing  a comparison  between  this issue
of  the  scope  of  federal  common  law  and  the  more-often-dis-
cussed Tenth Amendment  issue,  most recently developed  in the
National League  of  Cities 1  and  Garcia 2  cases,  concerning  the
scope  of congressional  power  to  regulate  the  states.  There  the
question has  been whether there  is any separate  area of activity
that  only  states  can  regulate  - where  only  state  law  can  ap-
ply  - or whether instead,  all subject matter areas may be  sub-
ject to regulation  by Congress  under the commerce  clause  of the
U.S.  Constitution  or other  expansive  congressional  powers.  The
resolution,  for the  moment at least,  is that there  is  no  separate
area where only states can regulate, even though all agree that it
is important that there be areas where state law controls. Indeed
it is not an overstatement  to say that the existence  of such areas
is  crucial to  our federal system.
Instead  of finding  areas  immune  from  congressional  reach,
however, the  Court, for the moment  at least, has  left the choice
*  Professor  of Law,  Harvard  University.  This paper  was  delivered  as  a talk  at the
AALS  meeting  in  San  Antonio,  Federal  Courts  section, January  6,  1992,  and  as  a  com-
ment upon  papers  prepared  by  Professors  George  Brown and  Thomas  Merrill.
1.  105  S.  Ct. 1005  (1985).
2.  Martha A.  Field, Garcia  v. San  Antonio Metropolitan  Transit Authority:  The De-
mise of a Misguided Doctrine, 99  HARV.  L. REV.  884,  110-118  (1985).
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of where to legislate to  Congress.  It  has suggested that the  only
limit  is that states  must remain  significant governmental  units.
If Congress were effectively  to eradicate the states, it would have
passed  constitutionally-permissible  limits,  but  up  until  that
point  the  choice  of both  how  much  and what to  regulate  rests
with the democratically-elected  Congress,  in which the states are
represented,  and  not with  the  Supreme  Court.
Some  charge that  by  deferring  so  much to  Congress  courts
violate  separation  of powers  and  federalism. 3  The  system  does
give  very  broad  power  to Congress  but  relies  on  congressional
restraint.  In  theory  Congress  could take  over  almost everything
but it has  in  fact left vast areas  where  only state  law  controls.4
No outside watchdog  has  forced  these limits on Congress;  it has
limited  itself.
There  are  some  parallels  behind  that  rather  familiar  topic
and our topic for today: whether there are limits on federal judi-
cial decisionmaking,  and, if so, where  they come  from. Both are
characterized  by an extremely broad power  being bestowed upon
an  institution  as  a  theoretical  matter,  and  they  are  both  also
characterized  by the  exercise  of great restraint.
In discussions  of federal  common  law,  as  we've heard  from
Professor Brown  for example, alarms are often raised about how
far courts could go  - alarms similar  to those raised  concerning
Congress's  power  unlimited  by  any  Tenth  Amendment  re-
straints. But in the situation of federal common law  as well, it is
important  to  recognize  that the  opportunity  has  not  been  pur-
sued.  Courts  have  shied  away  from  wielding  the  power  that  in
theory  has  been  left  to  them.  Just  as  Congress  has  not  come
close  to  the  outer  limit  of  its  potential  reach  under  the  com-
merce,  spending,  and taxing  powers,  to  name but a few,  so  the
federal courts have been sparing in their forays into federal com-
mon  law.
The real  issue  is not whether  federal common  law  is all-en-
compassing,  because  all agree that it should  not be. The real is-
sue is whether there should be  a check from without on the judi-
ciary  or  whether  the  judiciary  should  police  itself  through
3.  See,  e.g.,  William  Van  Alstyne,  The  Second  Death of Federalism, 85  MICH.  L.
REV.  1709 (1985).
4.  For example,  family  law, real  estate,  licensing,  and  zoning to  name  a few.
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application of the doctrine  of judicial  restraint. One  reason that
the outside  parameters  of the courts'  power have  not  been  well-
defined to date is that the Court has not come close to any limits
that  exist  - a  point  equally  valid  with  respect  to  exercise  'of
Congress' power without judicial restriction  in the form of Tenth
Amendment  review.
But  the particular  question  put to  us today  is  whether  the
creation  of federal  common  law  violates  the  separation  of pow-
ers,  and concerning that question  my answer is a resounding  no.
Indeed,  I believe that making federal  common  law poses  a more
serious threat to federalism  than it does to separation of.powers;
it  affects  the  federal-state  balance  more  than  the  relationship
between  the branches  of the  federal  government.
Federal  courts  can  make  common  law  only where  Congress
has not exercised  its  power to  act;  if a congressional  enactment
exists, courts  are  bound to  follow it.  Federal  court exercise  of a
common  law power cuts down on congressional power only if one
believes  that  congressional  failure  to  act  represents  a  congres-
sional  judgment  that  no  federal  lawmaking  should  exist.  That
judgment  surely  rarely  describes  the  real  significance  of a  con-
gressional  failure  to  legislate  in  an  area  in  its  competence. 5
Moreover  federal courts making  federal common  law attempt to
implement congressional  intent, insofar as they can  know it, and
if they err  and  make  a federal  common  law  rule  that  Congress
does  not  like,  Congress  can  alter  the  rule  by  passing  an  enact-
ment clearly  stating what  it wants  done.
States'  power  would  be  significantly  more  affected  than
Congress's  power  by  a broad exercise  of judicial  power  to make
federal  common  law.  Without judge-made  law,  where  Congress
had  not  acted  the  consequence  would  be  no  federal  law,  and
usually  state law  would  be  free to operate. Federal  common  law
can  compromise  state  lawmaking  authority  because  federal
courts make law more easily, more readily, than Congress will, at
least in some situations. Indeed every instance  in which a federal
court does exercise  this power to make federal common  law is by
definition  one  in  which  Congress  has not  acted,  so  therefore
every  exercise  of federal  common law  making power  takes away
5.  See generally HART  AND  SACKS,  THE  LEGAL  PROCESS  (10th  ed.  1958).
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from  the powers  of states.'
Although  considerations  of  federalism  are more  relevant  to
federal  common  law  power  than  are  concerns  of separation  of
powers,  I  don't believe  federal  common  law violates  either  doc-
trine.  Indeed,  I don't think it violates  any constitutional  princi-
ple,  as the ensuing  discussion  will  explain.
In  a  minute  I'm  going  to  talk  about  separation  of  powers
and about federal  common law on the merits, but first I want to
say something  about the  alternative  title  for this session,  "The
New Erie Doctrine Revisited."  I have problems with  referring to
this  question  as  "New  Erie."  The  title may  be  a catchy,  but  it
obscures analysis rather than aiding it. It  obscures  analysis, first,
because  "the  doctrine"  as  I  understand  it has  little  to  do with
Erie, and  even  more,  because  the label  is being used to refer  to
several  quite different ideas or doctrines,  each of which deserves
independent  consideration.  I  will  discuss  the  two  problems  in
turn.
My  first  problem  with  the  "New  Erie"  label  is  that  the
scope  of federal  law and its relation  to the separation  of powers
has  very little  to do  with Erie R.R.  v.  Tompkins7  and the Erie
doctrine.  To  me  the  important  aspect  of Erie's holding  is  that
the  same  law  is  to  apply  in state  and  federal  court,  including
state-created  common  law.  Erie  said  little  or  nothing  about
which law applies in which forum, except to say that identity  of
substantive  law  is  the  goal  - including  the  identity  of treat-
ment  of  common  law.  There  is  a  separate  question  of  which
law  - state  or  federal  - applies  to  which  type  of  issue,  a
question Erie does not answer. Erie's main contribution there is
to hold that the neither the Rules  of Decision Act nor article III
gives federal  courts power  to create common law in  ordinary di-
versity  actions.  But it does not enunciate  general  principles  for
deciding  when  federal  and when  state  law applies.8
This  description  of  Erie  contradicts  Professor  Brown's
6.  This  is  not  the  case,  however,  if there  would  otherwise  be  federal  preemption.
See, e.g., Ray v. Atlantic Richfield  Co.,  435 U.S.  151, (1978)  (oil tanker design standards);
City  of  Burbank  v.  Lockheed  Air  Terminal,  411  U.S.  624  (1973)  (airport  noise
regulation).
7.  305  U.S. 673  (1938).
8.  See generally Martha  A.  Field,  Sources of Law: The Scope of Federal Common
Law.,  99 HARV.  L. REv. 881  (1986).
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description of the  case as  a limit on national  power, an  attempt
to give  life to the Tenth Amendment.  I do not see Erie that way
at all. Instead the main theme the opinion addresses  is  the need
for law to  be  the same  in both  fora  - with the consequent  re-
duction  in  forum-shopping  that  will accomplish.
My  second  objection  to  the  use  of the  term  "New  Erie"  is
that I  can't  figure  out what  it means.  In trying,  I  have  become
convinced that  it is being used  to refer  to very  different things.
This has it made difficult for me to fulfill my assignment  of stat-
ing  my  position  on  "the  New  Erie  doctrine,"  because  I  agree
with  some  ideas that  are put  forth as  constituting  "New  Erie,"
while  I  strongly disagree  with others.
Sometimes "New Erie" is taken to mean there is some sepa-
ration  of powers  aspect  to  concerns  about federal  common  law,
in addition to an aspect  of federalism. Thus viewed, the doctrine
stresses  that  courts  should  be  more  limited  in  lawmaking  than
Congress  is;  they  should  not  too readily  make  federal  common
law,  should  not  fill  all  gaps  in  congressional  legislation,  and
should not act to the limit of Congress's powers. I would not use
"New  Erie"  in this  sense; Erie may have  some relevance  to the
issue,  but  surely  the  position  is  not  "new."  From  the  outset,
there was some separation  of powers aspect to the Erie holding.'
And  almost  everyone  agrees  that  courts  should not  feel  free  to
make federal common law up to the limit of Congress's powers; I
certainly  do.
A  different  meaning  often  assigned  to  "New
Erie"  - indeed  I believe  the  most usual  meaning  - is a posi-
tion developed  mostly by Justices  Powell and Rehnquist, in sev-
eral  cases  and  most notably  in Justice  Powell's  dissent  in Can-
non v.  University of Chicago' 0  - a position  that is potentially
highly restrictive  of federal  common  law.  In fact, if the position
were  followed  consistently,  it  would  make  almost  all  federal
common  law  illegitimate.  Both  because  it  is  so  restrictive  and
because it emphasizes separation  of powers instead of federalism
as  a  primary  restraint  upon  federal  common  law,  this  Powell-
Rehnquist position  is "new."  It seems, however,  to have  little to
do  with  Erie. Moreover,  this  "New  Erie" doctrine  is  one  with
9.  Id. at 905,  915-27,  933.
10.  441  U.S. 677,  730  (1979)  (Powell, J. dissenting).
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which  I  emphatically  disagree,  as I  will explain  later.
An additional, more workable variation  is the same doctrine
but  limited  to  implied  federal  remedies;  federal  common  law
could  persist  but  implied  remedies  are  distinguished  and  are
never  or almost never permissible. This  is a plausible limitation
of the  Powell-Rehnquist  position,  enunciated  almost  entirely  in
cases dealing with implied remedies.  Again, I would say the posi-
tion is  new, has  little to do  with Erie, and  has little to  offer  on
the  merits.
A  final and  very different  use of the  "New  Erie"  terminol-
ogy  is to refer  to the  idea  of a "judicial prerogative."  For exam-
ple,  Professor  Doernberg  describes  Professor  Redish  as  a  sup-
porter  of "New  Erie" based  upon  a  quotation  in which  Redish
states  that courts  should  not  contradict  congressional  intent.11
Until I read Professor Merrill's paper, I thought everyone agreed
that  courts  cannot  appropriately  create  federal  common  law  in
derogation of  congressional  intent  (unless  the  common  law  is
created  to fulfill a constitutional  mandate). 2  I  myself do not ac-
cept any notion of judicial prerogative,  as I will discuss later, but
have  not thereby  considered  myself a supporter  of "New  Erie."
Instead  of  lumping  together  such  an  assortment  of  posi-
tions, as  "New  Erie"  apparently does,  it would be better to sort
them  out and  to employ  a  label that refers  to the substance  of
each.  It  would  advance  analysis  if  scholars  would  describe  the
particular  position  they  want  to  put  forward  or  criticize  and
would  define  its terms.
I had a related  concern  in reading Professor  Brown's  paper
and seeing his references to what liberals  say and what conserva-
tives  say. The assumption was that whatever  one believes  politi-
cally  will  control  how  she  views  these  doctrines,  and  that  one
will  subscribe  either to  one set of positions  or another. Yet  one
criticism  many of us have  of the current  Supreme  Court  is that
the  Justices  use  these  doctrines  only  instrumentally. As  federal
courts  scholars  - certainly  as  followers  of  Hart  &  Wechsler
11.  Donald  Doernberg, Judicial Chameleons in the  "New  Erie" Canal, 4  UTAH  L.
REv.  759,  772  (1990).
12.  The commentator  who  goes the  furthest  in  endorsing  federal common  law and
the judiciary's right to create it is  Louis  Weinberg,  in  a very  thoughtful  and  interesting
series  of  articles.
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with whom Professor Brown associates himself  - we should ex-
pect persons  to value  federal  courts doctrines  at least partly  for
their own sake,  as great federal courts judges like Judge Friendly
and  Justice  Harlan  have  done.  I  myself agree  with  some  of the
positions  that  Porfessor  Brown  labels  as  "what  conservatives
think"  and  some  he  attributes  to  liberals,  and  I  suspect  that
many  federal  courts  scholars,  even  if they  consider  themselves
clearly  liberal  or  clearly  conservative,  would  find themselves  in
that position.
To  return  to  the  main  question  put to  us  today,  I  do not
believe that federal  common  law making violates  the  separation
of powers.  Instead, I believe  that attempts like Jusitces Powell's
and  Rehnquist's  to  create  rigid  rules  limiting  federal  common
law are fundamentally  misguided.  (You will note that of the sev-
eral "New  Erie"  doctrines  described  above, the one  I am consid-
ering  here,  and  the  one  that  description  probably  most  fre-
quently  refers  to,  is  the  Powell-Rehnquist  series  of arguments
that making federal common law, or at least finding implied fed-
eral remedies,  violates the  separation  of powers.)
But  the  issue  is  a complicated  one,  as  is  typical  of federal
courts. I am going to give you two examples to think about as we
consider the question whether it is all right for a federal court to
make  federal  common  law.  One involves  an  implied right of  ac-
tion and  one  does  not.
The  first  is  Cannon v.  University of Chicago. 13  The  issue
was  whether  there  was  a  private  right  of  action  for  damages
under  a  federal  statute  outlawing  sex  discrimination  in  admis-
sions  policies.  The  statute,  Title  IX,  provided  a  procedure  for
withdrawing  federal  funds  from  institutions  that  violated  the
law, but  the  law did  not spell  out  any private remedies.
The  second  example  to  consider  does  not  involve  implied
rights  of action.  This  is significant  because  one  of the subissues
in  the  federal  common  law  debate  is  whether  or  not  implied
rights  of  action  are  different  from  other  federal  common  law.
The  second  example  is  judicial  and  executive  immunities  from
civil  rights  or  constitutional  tort  actions.  These  would  include
suits against  state  officers  under  section  1983,  the  Civil Rights
13.  441  U.S.  677  (1979).
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Act,14 and  suits against  federal  officers  under  the  Constitution,
which  have  been  recognized  at  least  since  Bivens  v.  Six  Un-
known  Agents  of the  Federal Bureau of Narcotics. 1 5  In  these
cases,  use  of  federal  common  law  has  enabled  courts  to  find
broad  immunities  from  suits  - especially  suits  for  dam-
ages  - although  no  enacted  language  suggests  any  such
immunities. 6
The  Powell approach,  first thoroughly set forth in Cannon,
suggests  that it  is  not  appropriate  for  courts  to  make  federal
common  law  (or at least  find  implied  federal  remedies)  unless
Congress  specifically so intended.  Courts should not infer causes
of action from  a federal statute "absent the most compelling  evi-
dence  that Congress  in fact intended  such  an  action to  exist. ' 17
Justice  Powell  gives  two  reasons  for  saying  that  this  pre-
sumption  against  federal  common  law  is  required  by  the  doc-
trine of separation  of powers. The first is the one argument that
applies only and peculiarly  to federal remedies,  or implied rights
of action, and not to other  issues of federal  common law:  Powell
claims that courts'  finding  such remedies  amounts  to courts'  ex-
panding  their  own jurisdiction,  in  violation  of Article  III  of the
Constitution  which  reposes  in  Congress  the  power  to  delineate
the courts'  jurisdiction.8  It is true that when a court finds that a
federal remedy exists (or even that a colorable argument is made
that one  exists 9) that  finding  gives  the  federal  courts jurisdic-
tion to hear the dispute, under the prevailing judicial interpreta-
tion of Congress'  grant of federal  question jurisdiction.20
Justice  Powell's  second  argument  is  that  making  federal
common  law  more  easily  than  he  suggests  amounts  to  judicial
14.  42  U.S.C.  §  1983.
15.  403  U.S.  388  (1971).
16.  See,  e.g.,  Mireles  v.  Waco,  112  S.  Ct.  286 (1991);  Nixon  v. Fitzgerald  457  U.S.
731  (1982);  Butz v.  Economou, 438  U.S. 478  (1978);  Pierson v.  Ray, 386  U.S. 547  (1967).
17.  Cannon, 441 U.S.  at 749  (Powell, J.,  dissenting); see also id. at 718  (Rehnquist,
J., concurring).
18.  Id.  at 730-31,  745-47.
19.  Bell  v.  Hood,  327  U.S.  78 (1946).
20.  An argument that federal common law should govern an aspect of the case other
than the cause  of action  or remedy,  does not usually result  in federal  question  jurisdic-
tion, even  if the argument  is correct, and  even if the outcome  of the  case  depends upon
it. See also Martha  A.  Field,  The  Uncertain Nature of Federal  Jurisdiction,  22  WM.  &
MARY  L. REV.  638, 687-694  (1981).
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usurpation  of Congress's  lawmaking  functions.  He speaks of the
courts  as contradicting  Congress's intent. But no Justice believes
that courts should create  causes of action when Congress has de-
cided  not to do so. The problem arises because Congress's enact-
ments  are  often  silent  concerning  some questions,  and it is not
at all clear just what Congress  has decided  with respect to them,
if  it  has  thought  about  them  at  all.  Justice  Powell  would
strongly  presume  against  congressional  intent to  create  a  cause
of  action;  he  would  have  state  law  - or  no  law  - apply  by
default.
The  Cannon majority,  by  contrast,  would  allow  courts  a
third  option  as  well:  courts  could  apply  a  federal  common  law
rule  - a rule of the judiciary's making  - whenever that result
best fits with the  policies  behind congressional  legislation. Judi-
cial lawmaking would  be possible even  if no evidence  shows that
Congress adverted to the possibility of federal common  law. This
approach  might  be  described  as  a  search  for  a  "generalized"
rather than a "specific"  congressional  intent; it represents  an ef-
fort to  apply the  rule  most in  accord  with  congressional  intent
insofar  as  it  is  ascertainable,  but  courts  are  not  precluded  by
Congress's  failure  to advert to or  resolve the problem  at hand.2"
The  range  of  choices  available  to judges  in  a  no-federal-
common-law universe  are familiar to  constitutional law  scholars
because  of  the  jurisprudence  of  the  commerce  clause.  There,
when  federal  legislation  is  not explicit  about  a  governing  rule,
courts  have  long  undertaken  to  decide  whether  no  law  ap-
plies  - Congress  having  "decided"  to  leave  the  area  unregu-
lated  - or  whether  instead states  are  free  to  apply  their  own
rules.  It  was  early  decided  that  when  faced  with  a  commerce
clause  issue  to  which  Congress  had  not  spoken,  courts  would
choose  between  these two possibilities, and  would make  a choice
based  upon all the circumstances,  but would not exercise  a third
alternative  of itself creating  the governing  rule  - that is, mak-
ing federal common  law. Justice Powell's  proposal seemingly is  a
proposal  to carry over the commerce  clause  approach  to all con-
stitutional  and  statutory  provisions.  It  leaves  the  courts  faced
21.  See, e.g.,  Bush v. Lucas,  462 U.S. 367,  374 (1983)  (court's power to grant remedy
is "to  be exercised  in the light of relevant policy determinations made  by the Congress");
Merrill  Lynch  v.  Curran, 456  U.S.  353,  374-388  (1982).
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with  a silent congressional  enactment  two choices  - nonregula-
tion and state regulation  - but not the third choice of creating
an  appropriate  federal  rule.
If the  Court had accepted  Powell's position  in  Cannon, one
of  two  results  would  have  followed:  Either  no  damage  action
could be  found under  Title IX unless and until Congress revised
the enactment;  or instead state  law would  be  applicable  so  that
it  would  determine  whether  or  not  a  damage  remedy,  or  any
other remedy, supplements the withdrawal  of funds that federal
law  provides.  A  finding  that  federal  common  law  cannot  or
should  not be created  in  a  particular  instance  does  not  resolve
all facets of the inquiry what law is to apply. When, for example,
a court passing  on a federal  enactment  decides  that a  new  fed-
eral remedy should not be created to supplement those specified
in  the  enactment,  other  questions  remain  concerning  what  law
applies:  Can state remedies  supplement the federal remedies  ex-
pressly  provided,  especially  if  the  federal  remedies  are  narrow
and inadequate?2 2  It  would be difficult to eliminate discretion on
this  issue by adopting any hard and fast rule, and the Court has
never attempted  to, relying instead on a "generalized intent" ap-
proach. 2 3  Justice  Powell's approach  would, therefore,  confine ju-
dicial  discretion,  but it would by no  means  eliminate  it.
If, per  contra, the  legitimacy  of federal common  law  is rec-
ognized,  courts  can  consider  as well  the alternative  of announc-
ing what the federal rule is  - a rule they would derive from the
federal  policy  that is reflected  in  enacted  law.  They  would  opt
for  a federal  rule,  rather than  no law  or state law,  only  if con-
22.  There are other approaches as well as these  two courses, and the choices that the
Court  has  made  have  depended  on  the  context.  The  Court  has  sometimes  prohibited
state  remedies  altogether,  T.I.M.E.,  Inc.  v.  United States,  359 U.S.  464 (1959);  it some-
times  has found  it optional  with  the  states  whether  to provide any  remedy,  Moore  v.
Chesapeake  & Ohio  RR.,  291  U.S.  205  (1934);  it  has  sometimes  said  that states  must
provide  a remedy  but has left to the states what remedy to choose, Ward v. Love County,
253  U.S.  17  (1920);  and  it has  sometimes placed  federal  limitations  upon  remedies  that
states  can  provide,  New  York  Times  v. Sullivan,  376 U.S.  254  (1964).
23.  Arguably,  to be consistent, Powell should require judicial  decisions on this issue
as  well  to  be  governed  by  a specific  intent  standard. If courts were so  limited,  a strong
presumption  would  have  to  be  crafted  either  for  preemption  or  for regulation  by  state
law,  allowing  judicial  departure  from  the  presumption  only  if  Congress  specifically  so
intended.  Any  such standard applied  across the  board would  produce some uncomforta-
ble  results,  which  is  one  reason  it  has  not  been  adopted.  Instead  courts  decide  which
approach  is better under  all circumstances.
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vinced it was most consonant with congressional  intent that they
do  so. In  Cannon that means courts  can  find  it most consistent
with  Title  IX  that private  litigants  be permitted  to  enforce  its
requirements;  in  the  immunity  cases  it  means  courts  can  find
executive  and  judicial  immunities  despite  the  absence  of  any
mention  of those immunities  in  enacted  constitutional  or statu-
tory  law.
Of course, any formulation  - specific intent, specific direc-
tive,  generalized  intent, or  any  other  - can  be  applied  gener-
ously  or  stingily,  and  the  degree  of presumption  Powell  would
create  against  federal common  law  - or  implied  federal  reme-
dies  - is  not entirely  clear.  But there  are  indications that  the
Powell  position,  especially  as  it  has  been  developed  by  Chief
Justice  Rehnquist  and  others,  not  only  erects  a  presumption
against  federal  common  law  but  actually  undercuts  the  legiti-
macy of all  federal common  law.
First, Justice  Powell is ambiguous concerning  what it is that
Congress  must  specifically  have  intended.  The  most  sensible
construction  is  that  Congress  must  specifically  have  intended
that courts should make federal common law, or define  causes of
action to enforce the statute. But in some  parts of Powell's opin-
ion  he  seems to  go further,  requiring  also specific  congressional
intent as to the content of the law. Must Congress have  specifi-
cally  intended  the particular  cause  of action  (or  other  common
law  rule)  that the  court creates?  If not,  claims  Justice  Powell,
"the  court's implication  doctrine encourages  . . political default
by  Congress"  and
"invites  Congress  to  avoid  resolution  of  the  often  controversial
question  whether  a  new  regulatory  statute  should  be  employed
through  private  litigation.  Rather  than confronting  the  hard  po-
litical choices  involved, Congress is encouraged to shirk its consti-
tutional  obligation  and  leave  the  issue  to  the  courts  to  decide.
When  this  happens,  the  legislative  process,  with  its  public  scru-
tiny  and  participation,  has  been  bypassed,  with  attendant
prejudice  to everyone  concerned  ....  ,24
The  problem  with  that approach  is  that  it  leaves  no  room  for
federal  common  law;  even when  Congress  affirmatively  seeks  to
24.  Cannon, 441  U.S. at 743.
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use the courts  to fill out the contours  of the statutory scheme,  it
is  prohibited  from  doing  so.  Courts  can  make  no  rules  except
ones the Congress  specifically intended and yet, for some reason,
did not  spell out in  the enactment.
True,  Congress  as the  representative  branch  might  be well-
advised to decide  on  remedies and other applicable issues  itself,
rather  than  delegate  the  decision  to  the  courts.  Delegation
means that more  policy-making will  be made by the  non-demo-
cratically  selected  judiciary.  It  is  also  probably  true  that more
federal law will result, because  it is easier for Congress to enact a
law  federalizing  an area  and telling the  courts to devise the law
than it is for Congress  to create the law itself. But any such ob-
jections  are  more  properly  directed  to  Congress  than  imposed
upon  Congress  by  the  Supreme  Court.  And  not  all  agree  with
Justice Powell  that it is objectionable  for Congress to utilize the
courts  to  formulate  federal  law. Judge  Henry  Friendly  has  de-
scribed  Congress's  ability  to pass  on  these  decisions  as  "one  of
the beauties  of'  our system:
"[I]t  permits  overworked  federal  legislators,  who must vote  with
one  eye on the clock  and the other on the  next election,  so easily
to transfer  a part  of their  load  to  federal judges,  who  have  time
for  reflection  and  freedom  from  fear  as to tenure  and  are  ready,
even eager,  to resume  their historic law-making  function  - with
Congress  always able to set matters right if they go too far off the
desired  beam.25
A specific intent  prerequisite to federal common  law  should
relate to  the authorization  of judicial  lawmaking and  not to the
substance of the law to be made. To require  specific intent (or  a
directive)  relating  to  the  content  of the  law  strikes  out  at the
very  concept  of  federal  common  law.  Surely  one  cannot  force
Congress  always  to  decide  all  issues  in  legislation.  Surely  it  is
sometimes  better to allow  Congress  to leave gaps  in the  legisla-
tion to be  filled in by courts. Case-by-case  development  is  some-
times  the  wisest  choice;  sometimes  situations  or  even  solutions
emerge that one could not foresee  at the time of the legislation. 26
25.  Henry  Friendly, In  Praise of Erie - and the New  Federal Common Law,  39
N.Y.U.  L. REv.  383,  410  (1943).
26.  Perhaps the  issues of congressional endorsement  of lawmaking and congressional
endorsement  of the content of the rule have  been confused  because  in the remedial  con-
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Second,  the  approach  - inaugurated  in  Justice  Powell's
opinion  in  Cannon - developed  further  in  later  opinions  and
moved toward  a  no-federal-common-law  position.  This develop-
ment has been detailed  in other papers 27  so  I will review  it here
only  in  the  sketchiest  fashion.  In  Carlson v.  Green, Justice
Rehnquist  in  dissent  adopted  a  stricter  approach  than  specific
intent, saying that no  federal  common  law should  be found ab-
sent an explicit directive  in the enactment.2 8 His comments were
limited to rights  of action  inferred  from the Constitution, but in
Milwaukee v. Illinois the majority adopted the standard  and ap-
plied  it in  the  statutory  context  as  well.  Federal  common  law
should  be  found  only  when  an  enactment  specifically  so  di-
rects.29  Earlier Supreme Court majorities had rejected  such rigid
positions.
30
Consistently  applied,  the  Milwaukee  v.  Illinois approach
would bring an end to federal common  law because Congress has
not often  to  date  enacted  explicit  directives  that courts  should
create  federal common  law.31  (It has not enacted prohibitions ei-
text, the main context in which the strict rules are being suggested, the  distinction is  not
always  apparent  or important.  It  may be,  for example,  that Congress  adverting  to judi-
cially-created  causes of action would  correctly assume that damage actions were  the form
that would  be chosen. The distinction  can be important, however,  even in cases involving
remedies:  Is  it acceptable  for Congress  to enact  a statute and decide  that the  full reme-
dial scheme  is to be worked out by the judiciary?  If Congress explicitly  provides that the
judiciary shall  decide upon the  remedies, does the explicit  directive obviate any constitu-
tional difficulties  with the federal common law, or does such delegation  itself raise issues
about the  limits  of  federal  common  law?  As  my comments  in text should  make  clear,  I
believe  that such  a statute  is  constitutionally  unassailable  and  that Congress should  be
able  to use  judicial lawmaking  when  it desires  to do  so.
27.  See,  e.g.,  Doernberg, supra note  11.
28.  Carlson  v.  Green,  446  U.S.  14  (1980).
29.  Milwaukee  v.  Illinois,  406 U.S.  91  (1972).
30.  For  example,  in  United  States  v.  Little  Lake  Misere  Land  Co.,  the  Court,
through Chief Justice Burger,  rejected the argument that state law  applies "in  absence  of
an explicit congressional  command to the contrary. 412  U.S. 580, 591  (1973).  Similarly, in
Bush v.  Lucas, the Court rejected a requirement  of explicit  authorization.  462  U.S.  367,
375-76  (1983).
31.  There are occasional  examples of explicit  congressional directives,  however, such
as the  mandate  in rule  501 of the Federal  Rules of  Evidence that certain  questions  of
evidentiary privilege "shall be  governed  by the principles of common  law as they may be
interpreted  by the courts of the United States  in  light of reason and experience."  More-
over, Congress sometimes explicitly adopts state standards. See, e.g., Social Security  Act,
42  U.S.C.  § 416(h)(1)(A)  (1982);  Federal  Tort Claims  Act,  28  U.S.C.  §§  1346(b),  2674
(1982);  FED.  R.  EvID.  302,  601.
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ther,  though  if it  did  not want  courts  to act,  such  prohibitions
would be  fully effective.)  Unless  Congress  changes its  ways and
affirmatively  decides  and  states  that  courts  should  fill  in  the
contours of its legislation,  a rule requiring an explicit directive in
order  to  make  federal  common  law  would  result  in  no  federal
common  law  being permissible.
Proponents  of this  approach  avoid this result  only  by find-
ing exceptions  - areas where  their ban on federal common  law
does  not  operate  - for  example  if federal  law  preempts  state
law;  or  when  the  federal  rule  can  be  called  "interpretation"
rather than  "federal  common  law."'32  After the  Court's anti-fed-
eral  common law stance in Milwaukee  v. Illinois, for example,  it
used federal  common  law powers to create  a cause of action that
Congress  not  only  did not  specifically  intend  but  had  even  re-
peatedly  and specifically  rejected.  The Court rationalized  its re-
sult by making  a preemption  exception to the strict ban  on fed-
eral  common  law.
3 3  In  other  instances  also,  Justices  who  have
opposed  judge-found  causes  of  action  occasionally  themselves
find it necessary to create  one and simply proceed without refer-
ence  to  their  strict  rules. For  example,  Justice  Powell's  opinion
for  the Court  in  County of Oneida v.  Oneida Indian Nation,4
recognized  an  implicit  federal  common  law  right  of  Indians  to
sue to  enforce  their aboriginal  land rights and determined  from
all  the  circumstances  that  Congress  did  not  preempt  or  bar
those rights. Justice Powell  has  nowhere  attempted  to reconcile
his  views  in  cases  like  Cannon and  his  views  in  cases  like
Oneida.
One way to prevent the Powell-Rehnquist  position  from be-
coming the equivalent of a no-federal-common  law rule would be
to limit it to remedies.  After all, their approach  has been crafted
in  cases  involving  implication  of  federal  causes  of  action,  and
Powell  has stated that courts should  be most  reluctant to create
federal  common  law in that area because it increases  courts'  ju-
32.  See Field,  supra note  9, at 931.  Moreover,  some believe that courts  in any  event
can  provide  federal  remedies  for federal  rights,  when  they find  that course  appropriate.
Bivens  v.  Six  Unknown  Named  Agents,  403  U.S.  388,  402-06  (1971)  (Harlan,  J.,
concurring).
33.  Boyle  v.  United  Technologies  Corp.  487  U.S.  500  (1988).
34.  105  S.  Ct.  1245,  1251-59  (1985).
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risdiction.36  That  argument  is the  only  one, however,  that gives
any  basis  for  treating  implied  remedies  differently  from  any
other  federal  common  law  issue,  and  the  argument  is  a  weak
one. 3 6  Other  Justices  - Frankfurter  and  Harlan,  for  exam-
ple  - have  believed it easier to create  federal remedies than to
make  other  types  of  federal  common  law.  In  short,  while  it
would  be  convenient  to  limit  the  Powell-Rehnquist-Milwaukee
v. Illinois approach to implied rights  of action, there is little ba-
sis  for  separating that  category  of cases  out  from  other  federal
common  law questions or for treating them more restrictively. In
both  situations  the  problem  is how  the  judiciary  should  act  in
face  of  a  congressional  enactment  that  is  silent  on  the  issue
before  them.
Unlike  Justice  Powell,  I  believe- that  creating  federal  com-
mon  law  in  an  attempt  to  effectuate  the  generalized  intent  of
enacted  law  does  not  violate  separation  of powers.  Indeed  it is
more  consonant with it than the rules that have  been suggested
to limit federal common  law. Federal common  law should not be
seen as setting the various branches of the federal government at
odds  with each  other; the  power  conflict  it raises  is  much  more
between  federal  and state  power,  as described  above.
The  first reason  federal  common  law  does  not violate  the
separation  of powers  is that  the whole  purpose  of federal  com-
mon  law  is  to  effectuate  the  intent  of  enacted  law  and  not  to
countermand  it.  When  courts  make  federal  common  law  they
strive  to  carry  out  Congress's  plan  in  the  way  most  consonant
with  congressional  intent  and  policies,  while  recognizing  that
congressional  intent cannot always be known. Moreover, the rule
courts  create operates only as an interim measure,  to govern  un-
til  Congress acts  and makes  its choice  explicit.38
35.  Texas  Industries  Inc.  v.  Radcliff  Materials,  Inc.,  451  U.S.  630,  644-46  (1981);
Cannon  v.  University of Chicago,  441  U.S.  677,  748-49  (1979)  (Powell,  J., dissenting).
36.  See infra notes  44-46  and  accompanying  text.
37.  See Bivens v. Six Unknown  Named  Agents, 403 U.S. 388, 402-06  (1971)  (Harlan,
J., concurring);  Montana  & Dakota Util. Co. v. Northwestern  Pub. Srv. Co.,  341 U.S. 246,
261-62  (1951)  (Frankfurter, J. dissenting);  Bell v.  Hood, 327  U.S.  678, 684  (1946);  Royal
Indem. Co.  v. United States,  313 U.S. 289,  296  (1941);  Note, The Federal Common Law,
82  HARV.  L. REV.  1512,  1528 (1969)  (stating that specific congressional  intent  is needed  to
support rights but not remedies).
38.  The  only  exception  is  the  very  few  cases  where  the  Court  is  interpreting  the
Constitution  to  require  a  federal  common  law  rule,  in which  case  it  is  more  insulated
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Not only is the generalized intent approach  designed  to ful-
fill  congressional  intent, but  the specific  intent  and  other  strict
rules  of  construction  are  often  used  in  derogation  of  congres-
sional intent. While purporting to be rules of construction, often
they  are  used  to  fulfill  purposes  of the judiciary  that  Congress
does  not share.  They  purport  to  limit judicial  activism,  but  in
fact these  rules  allow  courts to insist  upon their own policies  in
the  face  of apparently  contrary congressional  enactments.
One  example  is  clear  statement approach  employed  in  The
Slaughter House Cases. 39  There  the Supreme  Court in  1873  in-
terpreted the privileges  and immunities clause  in the Fourteenth
Amendment  to  have  almost  no  meaning  and  then  embarked
upon  equally  narrow  definitions  of the  due  process  and  equal
protection  clauses.  The Court's  explanation  for  so underreading
the  Fourteenth Amendment  was that otherwise
"the effect is to fetter and degrade the state governments  by sub-
jecting  them to the control of Congress,  in the  exercise  of powers
heretofore  universally conceded  to them of the most ordinary and
fundamental character.  ..  [and]  radically  changes  the whole  the-
ory  of the  relations  of the  state  and  the Federal  governments  to
each  other and  of both  of these governments  to  the people.'
0
But  it was  precisely  such expansion  of federal  power  at the ex-
pense  of state  power  that the Fourteenth  Amendment  contem-
plated  - a fact the  Supreme  Court  has  since  recognized.
Another  example  is  the  recent series  of cases  in which  con-
gressional  statutes  purporting  to  let  individuals  sue  states  in
federal  court  have  been  "construed"  not to allow suit. The  Su-
preme  Court has held the Eleventh  Amendment  a bar to federal
jurisdiction  in the absence  of a clear statement  of congressional
intent  in  the  language  of the  statute  itself. It is  not the actual
congressional  intent that the Court is attempting to find in those
cases;  regardless  of the clarity of congressional  intent, the  Court
will not hold  federal causes  of action applicable  to suits  against
states  unless  Congress  in  the  legislation  has  employed  the  cor-
rect verbal  formula.41 In both examples,  the clear statement  ap-
from  congressional  revision.
39.  83  U.S.  36  (1873).
40.  Id.  at  78.
41.  See,  e.g.,  Dellmuth  v.  Muth,  491  U.S.  223  (1989);  Employees  of  the Dept.  of
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proach  was  used  as  a judicial  check  - and represents  judicial
activism more than restraint. Federal  common lawmaking  is not
judicial  usurpation  of  congressional  power  but  aims  to  fulfill
congressional  intent  not  to  transgress  it.  It  represents  an  at-
tempt to cooperate with and work with Congress to would sensi-
ble federal  policy.
Justice  Powell's  second  argument  concerning  separation  of
powers  - that  judicial  discovery  of  federal  remedies  violates
separation  of powers because  it increases  the jurisdiction  of the
federal  courts  - is also  a  weak one,  for  Congress  has nowhere
manifested  an  intention  that  federal  courts  exercise  federal
question jurisdiction  only when a federal remedy exists.4"  Courts
have interpreted federal law to require a federal  cause of action
for federal  question jurisdiction, 4 "  an interpretation  that reflects
substantial  judicial  restraint.  If the judiciary  has  limited  itself
with  the  remedy  test  for  federal  question  jurisdiction,  it  is
hardly  seizing  jurisdiction  of cases  not  intended  for  it when  it
finds  a federal  remedy exists.
If, as I contend,  federal common law contributes to congres-
sional-judicial  cooperation,  why  does  it  have  its  detractors?
What are  their  concerns  about federal  common  law?
The  first fear  concerning  broad  federal  common  law power
is that courts will find Congress allowed  it when  in fact Congress
did not and would not have  intended  a federal  rule  (or alterna-
tively,  would  not  have  intended  the  particular  rule  the  court
adopted).  As my defense  of federal common law as fulfilling con-
gressional  purposes should make  clear,  I  do not accept the  idea
of judicial prerogative  that is discussed by Professor Merrill. My
reaction  to his thesis is that of course federal  common  law must
be  in  accord  with  enacted  law.  I  was surprised  about the  doubt
he  expresses  about my  view, for  I  have consistently  maintained
that the central  requirement  of federal common law is that it be
authorized  by enacted  law.""
Public  Health and  Welfare  of  Missouri  v. Dept. of  Public  Health  and  Welfare  of  Mis-
souri,  411  U.S.  279  (1973).
42.  See  PAUL  M.  BATOR  ET  AL.,  THE  FEDERAL  COURTS  AND  THE  FEDERAL  SYSTEM  943
(3rd.  ed.  1988).
43.  American  Well  Works Co.  v.  Layne  & Bowler  Co.,  241  U.S.  257  (1916).
44.  See Field, supra note  9, at 927-30.  Moreover,  the overwhelming  majority  of Su-
preme  Court cases are consistent with that approach,  in  reasoning as  well as  in holding.
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I find it hard to understand  how Professor Merrill  can both
support  a  requirement  of  an  authorizing  enactment  and  also
take seriously the  notion of a judicial prerogative  to act in  dero-
gation  of congressional  intent,  for  it seems  to  me  that the  two
positions  are  not consistent with  each  other. There  is a contra-
diction in the way  Professor Merrill uses the term "judicial pre-
rogative"  in  his paper.  At  the  beginning  of the  paper  he talks
about a prerogative  "to  act according  to discretion  for the public
good,  without  the  prescription  of the  law  and  sometimes  even
against it."'4 5 Later, however,  Professor Merrill  states that "even
if federal  courts  have  inherent  power  to make  law,  presumably
they would not make  law that contradicts existing enacted  law."
I  agree  with  the latter statement  but  do not understand  how it
fits in with the former. It seems  to me there  is all the difference
between  these  two descriptions  and it is important to  maintain
the distinction  between them. A judicial lawmaking  - or filling
in  of enacted  law  - in pursuance of congressional  intent  is  a
very different creature  than the same power used  to circumvent
congressional  intent. Moreover,  in my view, the first of these ex-
ercises  is wholly  legitimate  and the latter  is  utterly illegitimate.
But  even  though  properly used  federal  common  law  may
fulfill congressional  intent, those fearful of federal  common  law
point out that courts with  power  to make  it also have  power to
usurp authority that Congress  did not and would  not intend  for
them. And  a related fear  is that courts  will make  too much fed-
eral  common  law;  they  will take  over the  decision  whether  fed-
eral  law will displace  state  law  and will  sometimes  go first with
the decision  that federal  law  is to govern.  This  would cut down
While  there are a few isolated  cases that can serve as examples  to the contrary, the same
three or four cases are always discussed to  illustrate this tendency,  while there  are many
hundreds  of cases  that support this basic  requirement  for federal  common  law.
I also  do not claim that all  federal common law can be explained as "interpretation."
I  do think that interpretation  and  federal common  law are on a  spectrum,  and that it is
hard  to  know  at  what  point  to  draw  the  line  between  them,  so  I  would  try to  avoid
relying  upon a  test depending  upon this distinction.
For  example,  a  rule  forbidding  federal  common  law  but allowing  "interpretation"
might  lead  to some anomalous  results.  It might mean  that it was not possible for  courts
to create  federal executive  or judicial  immunities but that could  still  create  such immu-
nities for state  officials;  for state officials,  the immunities could be  seen as interpretation
of section  1983, while  no  such  statute  exists  in  relation  to  federal  officials.
45.  quoting  LOCKE,  Two  TREATISES  OF  CIVIL  GOVERNMENT  220  (Everyman  ed.  1970)
(emphasis added  in Merrill's  paper).
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on  the powers  of the states  vis  a vis the federal  government,  as
we  have  seen. Moreover, the  ideal of federalism,  as explained  in
both  National League  of  Cities  and  Garcia,  is  that  Con-
gress  - and  not  the  politically-insulated  courts  or  any  other
body  - decides whether federal law should displace state law."6
One way of addressing these dangers that do lurk in judicial
common  law  power  is  to  adopt  strict  rules  concerning  when  it
can  be made  - like Powell's  specific intent requirement  or  the
stricter  explicit  directive  approach of Rehnquist in Carlson and
the Court  in Milwaukee  v.  Illinois. Such  rules  consistently  fol-
lowed  would cut back drastically  on federal common law and re-
duce the opportunity for judicial usurpation. The problem,  how-
ever,  is  that the cure  would  be  far  worse  than the disease. The
rigid rules  would  prevent courts  from  creating  federal  common
law  where  it  was  not  intended,  but  they  would  also  prevent
courts from  fulfilling judicial  functions.
Much  can  be  said  for  Congress  making  these  decisions
rather  than the  courts,  but the  fact  of the  matter  is  that there
will  always  be  issues  involved  in  congressional  legislation  that
Congress  does  not think about  and  resolve.  The judiciary  often
may  be  the  first  body  that  has  actually  considered  whether  a
cause of action  (or immunity or any other  issue) exists in a par-
ticular  situation;  no one else  may have  adverted  to the question
of the appropriateness  of federal versus state law. Courts are less
suited than Congress to find facts, to deal with certain areas in a
systematic  fashion,  and  to  decide  questions  of  policy.  But  we
should  recognize  as  well  the  particular  institutional  advantages
that courts have in lawmaking and not jeopardize  the benefits  of
the judicial process  in our endeavor  to  prevent excesses.  Courts'
perspective  of  hindsight  means  they  may  become  better  ac-
quainted  with  the  problems  that actually  arise  under  a federal
scheme.  And surely they often  can understand  - in a  way that
Congress,  operating  in  the  abstract,  could  not  have  - how  a
particular  congressional  scheme  impacts  on  the  parties  before
them.  Moreover  judges'  detachment  from  the  political  process
may  increase  our  confidence  that reason  and fairness will  guide
their  decisions.  Because  only  the  approach  of judicial  searching
46.  For  a  fuller description  of  valid  separation  of  powers  and  federalism  concerns
about  federal  common  law, see Field,  supra note  9,  at 930-34.
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for the framers'  intent, in the sense  of generalized intent, allows
the judiciary  properly  to perform  its function,  it  is  more  conso-
nant  with  separation  of  powers  than  the  rules  strictly limiting
federal  common  law.
Supporters  of an explicit directive  requirement  may believe
that it would  force  Congress  actively  to make  the  decision  now
made  by the judiciary  - to think about whether  state  or  fed-
eral  law  would  best  fill  any  gap,  and  to  express  itself on  that
point. Congress  is free to  make the  decision now,  of course,  but
it does not  do so.  The  threat that  otherwise  state  law must al-
ways  apply  - that  no  other  body  can  address  the  issue  and
come  to  the  proper  conclusion  - is  to make  Congress  change
its ways.
Even if one believes it appropriate  to attempt to manipulate
Congress  in this  way,  there  is a substantial  question  whether  a
different  judicial  approach  really  would  produce  a  change  in
congressional  practice.  And  even  if Congress  did  attempt to ad-
dress  these  issues,  so that specific  directives  in  favor  of federal
(or state)  law sometimes  resulted,  it seems  inevitable  that Con-
gress could not foresee all possible questions that would arise. If,
as  I  predict,  a  rigid  rule  limiting  federal  judicial  creativ-
ity  - such  as  those  requiring  specific  intent or  an  explicit  di-
rective  - would create  a need  to add "other  categories"  where
federal  courts  can make  federal  common  law  more  easily,  then
judicial discretion  would still control, but the  whole  controversy
over federal common  law  would have  had the principal  effect  of
creating one more set of analytical  hoops for litigants, courts and
scholars  to jump through.
In this respect the  attempt to create strict rules  as to when
federal  common  law  is  authorized  reminds  me  of  the  Tenth
Amendment issue with which we started. Just as in that context
courts  have  found  over  time  that there  is  no  way  to  set out  a
separate  sphere  into  which  congressional  regulation  cannot  in-
trude,  so  here  there  is  no  way  satisfactorily  limit court  power
with a hard and fast rule.  Because it is impossible to delineate  a
clear  rule that  is satisfactory,  it is best to leave  the judiciary to
draw  lines. It has  done  that to  date by  a presumption  for state
law  and  a general  policy  of restraint. 7
47.  See  Field, supra  note  9,  at 950-62.  Justice  Harlan  summed  up the appropriate
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Because it is not possible to create  effective, strict standards
for  federal  common  law  without  displacing  courts  in  their  cen-
tral role, the real  limits upon  federal  common  law  are forged by
judicial  self restraint.  Great  Justices  like  Justice  Harlan  under-
stood that  it is  this  policy  that must hold  the judiciary  within
proper  bounds  and  not  any  limitation  from  without.  Justice
Harlan  cared about  protecting states'  rights, but he did not em-
ploy  rigid  formulas  in  defining  the  bounds  between  state  and
federal power.  He  employed this  approach  not only in this area
of federal  common  law  and implied  rights  of  action but  also  in
other  areas.  For  example,  he  maintained  that  the  Fourteenth
Amendment's  Due  Process  Clause  is violated  by  rules that  vio-
late  fundamental  fairness  or  that shock  the  conscience,  and  he
avoided  the  more  rigid  formulas,  such  as the incorporation  ap-
proach, that some  Justices  claimed  would  more  effectively  keep
the  Court  from  writing  its  own  preferences  into  the
Constitution. 8
The  formulas  Harlan  used  - such  as  fundamental  fair-
ness  - give  great  room  for  judicial  leeway;  they  could  only
achieve  the  purpose  Harlan  desired  of them  by the  exercise  of
judicial self-restraint.  Harlan  talked  often  of the  importance  of
such  restraint  but  was  prepared  to  rely  upon  the  judiciary  to
supply  it. Indeed reliance  upon judicial  self restraint concerning
federal  common  law, as well  as other  subjects, is  almost inevita-
ble,  because  judges  are  the  decisionmaker  to  whom  the  argu-
ment  for  limits  on  the  judiciary  are  addressed;  they  are  the
guardians  of the standard  and have  been ever  since  Marbury v.
Madison. 9
In  one  sense the  argument  for  strict standards  - whether
inquiry  in Wallis  v. Pan  Am  Petroleum  Corp.,  384  U.S. 63,  68-69  (1966).  He  there  sug-
gested that the  first inquiry  a judge should  make  in  deciding  whether  to  displace state
law  with  federal  is  whether  state  law  poses  "any  significant  threat  to  any  identifiable
federal  policy or  interest."  Only  after it  crosses this hurdle should the  court  proceed "to
consider other questions  relevant to  invoking  federal  common  law, such as  the strength
of  the  state  interest  in  having  its  own  rules  govern,  . . . the  feasibility  of  creating  a
judicial  substitute  . . . and other  similar  factors."  This  test  creates  a  presumption  for
state law,  allowing  the creation of federal common  law only  when  there is  an  overriding
need  for  it.
48.  See  Griswold  v.  Connecticut,  381  U.S.  479  (1965)  for an  example  of  the  debate
between  Justice  Harlan and  others,  most notably  Justice Black.
49.  5  U.S.  (1 Cranch)  137  (1803).
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the  Powell  or  the  Rehnquist  version  - is  that  the  judiciary
should  create  a per  se  rule  to  limit  itself.  Perhaps  the  courts'
reply should  be that if Congress wants to limit the courts to any
particular  procedure  or to take  away judicial  power  in any  class
of  cases  it can  do  so  by statute, but in  the absence  of  congres-
sional  action  the  judiciary  will  leave  the  judicial  function
unimpaired. 5
Professor Merrill expresses great reluctance  to rely upon ju-
dicial  restraint,  but  I  believe  we  should  not feel  uncomfortable
with  this  as  a  resting  place.  I  do  not  understand  his  position,
especially since  the standards  he recommends  ostensibly to limit
the judiciary  - notably requiring that there be an implicit (not
explicit)  directive  as  a  precondition  for  federal  common
law  - are  essentially  equivalent  to  relying  on  judicial  re-
straint. 1  In any case, judicial restraint seems  to have worked  so
far,  causing  federal  common  law  to  be  made  only  sparingly.  If
Professor  Merrill  finds  this  resolution  objectionable,  he  should
tell us what rule he plans to substitute for judicial restraint that
will lead both  to  less discretion  and to better results.
While  I think he should frankly acknowledge  and accept our
dependence  upon judicial restraint in the proper  delimitation  of
federal common law, I agree  with most of what Professor  Merrill
says about the  federal common  law's  limits, and I  found his pa-
per very interesting and informative. Probably the biggest differ-
ence  between  us  concerns  how  easily  an  enactment  should  be
construed  to  authorize  the  making  of federal  common  law.  The
issue  is  a  difficult  one.  In  fact  I  agree  with  Professor  Merrill's
position that courts  should not easily  find  federal  common  law,
but unlike  him  I  am  not ready  to  accept  any  rules  to  back  up
that  precept.  Without  such  rules,  the  call  for  moderation
amounts to a call  for judicial  restraint. I believe  we  must neces-
50.  Professor  Redish argues that in the  Rules  of Decision  Act the  Congress has di-
rected federal  courts  not to make  common  law. Martin  Redish,  Federal Common Law,
Political Legitimacy, and the Interpretive Process: An  "Institutionalist"  Perspective,
83  Nw.  U. L.  Rav. 761,  766,867  (1989).  His  construction  of the RDA  is,  however,  by  no
means obvious. See Field, supra note 9, at 903-904.  As I have  explained  thoroughly  else-
where,  Erie interprets the  Rules of Decision  Act to command  that the grant of diversity
jurisdiction  is  not  alone  sufficient  to  support  federal  common  law  and  that  statutes
granting  federal jurisdiction  do  not  necessarily  enable  federal  courts  to make common
law.  Id. at 922-23,  928-29.
51.  See Field, supra note  9, at 941-42.
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sarily rest here because  it is not possible to craft rules to restrict
courts that are both workable and set real limits. Certainly none
has  yet  been  suggested.  In  this  respect,  this  area  is  like  the
Tenth Amendment  issue  that we  started  with:  Congress  should
not displace  state  lawmaking,  but  we have  not found  any  good
rules to impose from the outside to limit Congress's power.  With
both congressional  and judicial lawmaking,  it may be  better  for
Congress  and  the  courts  to  limit  themselves  - at least  for  as
long as  they continue  to  do so within  reasonable  bounds.
23